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RECENT CASES
The present decision is significant when looked at for its narrow preceden-
tial value. There can be little doubt that the Court, as presently constituted, will
continue to apply the same presumption and strict reading of the statute. The
history of litigation concerning the status of adopted children in bequests and de-
vises to a class has exhibited persistent concern for these children. One court, in
excluding an adopted child from participation because of an absence of intention
of the testator to favor the child, seemed wholly dissatisfied with the presumption
applied in the greater number of cases when it stated that "any consideration
of the problem by search for an intention to benefit the adopted child does
not give section 115 [of the Domestic Relations Law] real effect.1 45 Thus it
would seem that the decision in the instant case has, for the immediate future,
settled a frequent and troublesome source of litigation in the law of estates as
applied to wills and trust instruments of persons dying before the 1963 legisla-
tive amendments. 46 Whether the ends achieved by the Court justify the means
used however, is highly doubtful. The Court has, in its task of creating certainty
in the law and promulgating the public policy regarding adopted children, left
behind it scarred and battered remnants of principles of the law of wills.
RONALD J. THoMAs
EVIDENCE--AFmAvIT CONCERNING JURORS' UNAUTHORIZED VIEW IN-
ADMISSIBLE As GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL
One defendant was convicted of burglary in the third degree and possession
of burglary instruments as a felony, the other defendant was convicted of the
same burglary count and possession of burglary instruments as a misdemeanor.
Defendants moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial based on an affi-
davit of defendants' trial counsel alleging that certain of the jurors told him
shortly after the verdict was rendered that during the trial, without direction of
the court, they had visited the premises where the crimes were allegedly com-
mitted. On a joint appeal from an affirmance of the trial court's order denying
the motions, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. Jurors may not impeach their
own duly rendered verdict by statements averring their own misconduct outside
the jury room presented in the form of hearsay affidavits, and although an un-
authorized view of such premises is improper, it is not, without more, such an
impropriety as to require granting of a new trial. People v. DeLucia, 15 N.Y.2d
294, 206 N.E.2d 324, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1965), cert. denied, 34 U.S.L. Week
3106 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1965).
45. In the Matter of the Estate of Taintor, 32 Misc. 2d 160, 163, 222 N.Y.S.2d 882,
885 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
46. The presumption to be applied is now the same for an cases. In controversies
where the testator or settlor has died prior to the 1964 effective date of the amendments,
the presumption will be applied by "virtue" of the present case. Where the testator or settlor
has died after the effective date, the presumption by virtue of Section 49 of the Decedent's
Estate Law will control. For text of statute see note 15 supra.
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A vast majority of American jurisdictions' still adhere to the rule early
adopted from Lord Mansfield 2 that a juror may not impeach his own verdict.
Before the early 1780's affidavits and testimony of jurors were freely received
to impeach their verdict.3 This prohibition against self-impeachment was first
based on the policy that a juror will not be heard to allege his own turpitude.4
In later discussions, particularly in American courts, the rule was also based on:
(1) the parol evidence rule,5 (2) a privilege against disclosure of juror's com-
munications during deliberations,' (3) policies to avoid encouraging jury tamper-
ing,7 (4) juror perjury,8 (5) destroying the secrecy of jury room and thereby
inhibiting a juror's frankness and freedom of discussion during deliberations, 9
(6) a fear of prolonged litigation'0 and (7) uncertainty in the finality of
verdicts." The injustice flowing from the inflexible application of the rule has
led to its modification. 1 2 A few jurisdictions have adopted the Iowa rule and
permit a juror's affidavit to show "any matter occurring during the trial or in
the jury room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself. .... ,
Although there are different interpretations of "inhere,"' 14 generally overt
factors which may have influenced his decision, which can be verified by
others, including fellow jurors, are considered by the court, but evidence con-
cerning a juror's mental processes or the effect of events or conditions in influ-
encing his vote is excluded.' 5 Other jurisdictions have distinguished between
1. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2354 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (Excellent and exhaus-
tive survey of state cases and their holdings).
2. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785).
3. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2352.
4. Id. § 2352. But see Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 57 (Sup. Ct. 1805)
(Livingston, J., dissenting). "Are not criminals in England every day convicted, and even
executed, on their own confession?" Id. at 59.
5. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2348 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (Cardozo, J.); see In re Nunns, 188 App.
Div. 424, 176 N.Y. Supp. 858, 38 N.Y. Crim. 7 (2d Dep't 1919) ; 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2346
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
7. Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874) ; State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812, 58
A.L.R.2d 545 (1955), 56 Colum. L. Rev. 952 (1956), 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1003 (1956); Payne
v. Burke, 236 App. Div. 527, 260 N.Y. Supp. 259 (4th Dep't 1932).
8. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1954); Caldwell v. F. E. Spears
& Sons, 186 Ky. 64, 216 S.W. 83 (1919) ; State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St. 423, 48 N.E.2d 861, 2S
Ohio Op. 570, 146 A.L.R. 509 (1943).
9. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). "Freedom of debate might
be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their argu-
ments and ballots were to be freely published to the world." Id. at 13; McDonald v. Pless,
238 U.S. 264 (1915); In re Nunns, 188 App. Div. 424, 176 N.Y. Supp. 858, 38 N.Y. Crim. 7
(2d Dep't 1919).
10. Stromblad v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 121 Misc. 322, 201 N.Y. Supp. 67 (Sup. Ct.
1923) ; State v. Gardner, 230 Or. 569, 371 P.2d 558 (1962) ; Hudson v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.)
408 (1836).
11. Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958); Wright v. Illinois & Miss.
Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); Robbins v. Windover, 2 Tyl. (Vt.) 11 (1800).
12. Fisch, New York Evidence § 305 (1959).
13. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866).
14. Compare State v. Lorenzy, 59 Wash. 308, 109 Pac. 1064 (1910) ("inheres" means
"lost in" or "covered by" the verdict), with Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874) (within the
personal consciousness of a juror).
15. Southern Pacific Ry. v. Klinge, 65 F.2d 85 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 290 U.S. 657
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events occurring outside the jury room and events within the jury room.16 The
exclusionary rule is applied only to the deliberations of the jury and a juror's
affidavit alleging his own misconduct or misconduct of a fellow juror, outside
the jury room, is accepted as competent evidence.17 Texas abolished Lord
Mansfield's rule by statute, but the evidence must be restricted to overt acts.18
Where the verdict was reached by chance, many states have statutes providing
for an exception to the prohibition against a juror's self-impeachment. 9
The early New York decisions2 ° followed the rule in Vaise v. Delaval2l and
refused to consider a juror's affidavit tending to impeach his previously rendered
verdict. In Dalrymple v. Williams22 the New York Court of Appeals said that
this rule excludes affidavits "to show mistake or error of the jurors in respect to
the merits, or irregularity or misconduct, or that they mistook the effect of their
verdict and intended something different." 23 The Court reasserted this exclu-
sionary rule in People v. Sprague24 stating that "jurors cannot by their affidavits,
even if those affidavits aver misconduct outside the jury room, attack or discredit
the verdict which they have in fact recorded or rendered." 25 However, this strict
rule has been modified. Jurors' affidavits have been accepted to deny their
alleged misconduct, since the affidavits are not being used to impeach their
(1933).; Martinez v. Ashton, 124 Colo. 23, 233 P.2d 871 (1951) (dictum); City of Miami v.
Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158 So. 89, 97 A.L.R. 1035 (1934); Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874) ;
Sprinkle v. State, 137 Miss. 731, 102 So. 844 (1925); Harris v. State, 24 Neb. 803, 40 N.W.
317 (1888); State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812, 58 A.L.R.2d 545 (1955); Turner &
Sons v. Great Northern Ry., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W. 489 (1937); State v. Gardner, 230 Or.
569, 371 P.2d 558 (1962); Crawford v. State, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 60 (1821) ; State v. Lorenzy,
59 Wash. 308, 109 Pac. 1064 (1910).
16. Maguire, Weinstein, Chadbourn, and Mansfield, Cases and Materials on Evidence
887 (5th ed. 1965).
17. Driscoll v. Gatcomb, 112 Me. 289, 92 At. 39 (1914) (unauthorized visit to plaintiff's
home); Collins v. Splane, 230 Mass. 281, 120 N.E. 66 (1918) (unauthorized view); Pierce v.
Brennan, 83 Minn. 422, 86 N.W. 417 (1901) (unauthorized view); Welshire v. Bruaw, 331
Pa. 392, 200 At. 67 (1938) (dictum) (misconduct of officer in charge of jury); Peppercorn v.
City of Black River Falls, 89 Wisc. 38, 61 N.W. 79 (1894) (unauthorized view).
18. Texas Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 753(8) (1950). "New trials . . . shall be granted
. where, from the misconduct of the jury, the court is of the opinion that the defendant
has not received a fair and impartial trial. It shall be competent to prove such misconduct
by the voluntary affidavit of a juror .... "; Tex. R. Civ. P. 327 (1954). "Where the ground
of the motion [for new trial] is misconduct of the jury ... or because of any communication
made to the jury or that they received other testimony . . . the court shall hear evidence
thereof from the jury or others in open court, and may grant a new trial if such misconduct
proved, or the testimony received, of [sic] the communication made ... be material, and if
it reasonably appears from the evidence both on the hearing of the motion and the trial of
the case and from the record as a whole that injury probably resulted to the complaining
party." See generally Pope, The Mental Operations of Jurors, 40 Texas L. Rev. 849 (1962)
Comment, 15 Texas L. Rev. 101 (1936).
19. E.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. § 657 (1872); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 465(4).
20. Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. R. (N.Y.) 487 (Sup. Ct. 1809); Clum v. Smith, 5 Hill
(N.Y.) 560 (Sup. Ct. 1843). Contra, Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Cal. R. (N.Y.) 57 (Sup. Ct. 1805).
21. 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785).
22. 63 N.Y, 361 (1875).
23. Id. at 363.
24. 217 N.Y. 373, 111 N.E. 1077 (1916); accord, Williams v. Montgomery, 60 N.Y. 648
(1875).
25. People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 381, 111 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1916).
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verdict but to sustain it.26 Similarly, a juror's affidavit has been accepted where
a mistake has occurred in announcing or recording the verdict, the reason being
that it is an attempt to establish, rather than reverse, the action of the jury.2 7
Jurors' affidavits have been considered as evidence of other persons' misconduct
in their dealings with the jurors, the exclusionary rule being interpreted as
applying only to misconduct of jurors.28 Jurors' affidavits have also been ac-
cepted, in support of a motion for new trial, to disclose a juror's concealed
prejudice on voir dire, on the ground that due to his partiality he was never
eligible to become a member of the jury; hence his vote was a nullity and there
was no verdict to be impeached.29 Although non-jurors' affidavits concerning
juror misconduct are not excluded by Lord Mansfield's rule,30 affidavits contain-
ing statements made to the affiant by a juror are not admissible and are excluded
as hearsay.31
Competent evidence of juror misconduct will not be a ground for a new trial
unless it be shown that the verdict was affected thereby.32 In New York criminal
cases a new trial will be granted only where the substantial rights of the de-
fendant have been prejudiced.3 3 Such a motion is generally addressed to the
26. Haight v. City of Elmira, 42 App. Div. 391, 59 N.Y. Supp. 193 (3d Dep't 1899);
Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. R. (N.Y.) 487 (Sup. Ct. 1809); Moore v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co.,
24 Abb. N. Cas. 77, 8 N.Y. Supp. 329, 18 Civ. Proc. R. 146, 15 Daly 506 (C.P. 1890), afl'd,
24 Abb. N. Cas. 74, 8 N.Y. Supp. 769, 15 Daly 510 (C.P. 1890), rev'd on other grounds, 130
N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892). See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R. 1449 (1934).
27. Dalrymple v. Williams, 63 N.Y. 361 (1875) (Foreman mistakenly announced verdict
for plaintiff); Wirt v. Reid, 138 App. Div. 760, 123 N.Y. Supp. 706 (1st Dep't 1910) (mistake
of clerk in entering verdict).
28. Schrader v. Joseph H. Gertner, Jr., Inc., 282 App. Div. 1064, 126 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d
Dep't 1953); Thomas v. Chapman, 45 Barb. (N.Y.) 98 (Sup. Ct. 1865); Wilkins v. Abbey,
168 Misc. 416, 5 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
29. People v. Leonti, 262 N.Y. 256, 186 N.E. 693 (1933); McHugh v. Jones, 258 App.
Div. 111, 16 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't 1939), aff'd mem., 283 N.Y. 534, 29 N.E.2d 76, 17
N.Y.S.2d 396 (1940); People v. Whitmore, 45 Misc. 2d 506, 257 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct.
1965). "The action of the juror taints the trial in its origin. It destroys the very foundation
of our democratic processes and makes the trial a farce." Id. at 509, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
Contra, Payne v. Burke, 236 App. Div. 527, 260 N.Y. Supp. 259 (4th Dep't 1932). See gen-
erally Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 971 (1956).
30. Johnson v. Riter-Conley Mfg. Co., 149 App. Div. 543, 133 N.Y. Supp. 1004 (1st
Dep't 1912); Morehead v. Graham, 193 Misc. 388, 83 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1948), afJ'd
mnzer., 276 App. Div. 1057, 96 N.Y.S.2d 475 (4th Dep't 1950) (jurors' affidavits regarding
their discussion with defendant's wife not accepted, affidavit of defendant's wife accepted) ;
Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785) (dictum). "The court must derive their
knowledge from some other source, such as from some person having seen the transaction
through a window. . . ." Id. Cf. People ex rel. Choate v. Barnett, 24 Abb. N. Cas.
430, 18 Civ. Proc. R. 230, 9 N.Y. Supp. 321, 56 Hun 351, 8 N.Y. Crim. 13 (Sup. Ct.), aJJ'd
nern., 121 N.Y. 678, 24 N.E. 1095 (1890) (intentional eavesdropping as contempt of court).
31. People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 111 N.E. 1077 (1916); Gregory v. Bijou Theater
Co., 138 App. Div. 590, 122 N.Y. Supp. 1085 (3d Dep't 1910); Bennett v. Nazzaro, 144 Misc.
450, 258 N.Y. Supp. 828 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., 237 App. Div. 866, 261 N.Y. Supp. 1018 (3d
Dep't 1932).
32. Roberts v. United States, 60 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1932); People v. Johnson, 110 N.Y.
134, 17 N.E. 684 (1888) ; Moore v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 24 Abb. N. Cas. 77, 8 N.Y. Supp.
329, 18 Civ. Proc. R. 146, 15 Daly 506 (C.P. 1890), aff'd, 24 Abb. N. Cas. 74, 8 N.Y. Supp.
769, 15 Daly 510 (C.P. 1890), rev'd on other grounds, 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892).
33. People v. Johnson, supra note 32; People v. Jones, 115 N.Y. Supp. 800 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 194 N.Y. 83, 86 N.E. 810 (1909); People v. Kraus, 147 Misc. 906, 265 N.Y. Supp. 294
(Ct. Gen. Sess. 1933); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 465.
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discretion of the trial court and the court's action is ordinarily not reviewable.3 4
An unauthorized view3 5 is invariably improper, the only issue being whether
the extent of the impropriety requires a new trial.36 A view not under the direc-
tion of the court is improper because of the danger that the jurors may view the
wrong objects and because of the subsequent difficulty of determining whether
they have viewed the right objects. 37 If the court considers a view as constituting
independent evidence, the court has no control over the introduction of this
evidence and there is no opportunity for it to be rebutted.3 8 There are also the
dangers that the conditions of the premises have changed since the occurrence
in issue"0 and that the jurors will receive information from unsworn witnesses in
violation of the hearsay rule.40 In New York a mere visit and inspection of the
premises by the jurors, in the absence of the defendant, is not in itself violative
of the defendant's rights, and is not the taking of evidence within section 465
Code of Criminal Procedure4 ' and the New York State Constitution.
42
The majority decision in the instant case is a traditional analysis of the
problem.43 The Court first refuses to accept the affidavit as competent evidence
but then continues to consider its contents to determine to what extent the
defendant's rights would be prejudiced by the existence of the alleged facts.
Chief Judge Desmond, writing for the minority, dissents on the ground that
Lord Mansfield's rule is being used to validate "a transgression of fundamental
34. People v. Johnson, supra note 32; People v. Durling, 303 N.Y. 382, 103 N.E.2d 336(1952) (counsel should have been given opportunity to supply affidavits) ; Buffalo Structural
Steel Co. v. Dickinson, 98 App. Div. 355, 90 N.Y. Supp. 268 (4th Dep't 1904).
35. A view is an inspection by the jury of a place where the event in issue occurred.
Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 140 N.E. 470 (1923).
36. Gambon v. City of New York, 153 Misc. 401, 274 N.Y. Supp. 653 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1166 (3rd ed. 1940). Contra, Curry v. Quait, 100 Misc. 604, 166 N.Y.
Supp. 367 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (unauthorized view invariably prejudicial so as to require a new
trial).
37. 4 Wigmore supra note 36.
38. Aldrich v. City of Minneapolis, 52 Minn. 164, 53 N.W. 1072 (1893).
39. Briggs v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 243 Minn. 566, 68 N.W.2d 870 (1955).
40. People v. Gallo, 149 N.Y. 106, 43 N.E. 529 (1896).
41. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 465 provides, in part:
The court.., has power to grant a new trial, when a verdict has been rendered
against the defendant, by which his substantial rights have been prejudiced, upon his
application, in the following cases:
2. When the jury has received any evidence out of court, other than that re-
suiting from a view, as provided in section four hundred and eleven;
3. When the jury have separated without leave of the court, after retiring to
deliberate upon their verdict, or have been guilty of any misconduct by which a fair
and due consideration of the case has been prevented; ....
42. People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 50 N.E. 947, 42 L.R.A.. 368 (1898); Haight v. City
of Elmira, 42 App. Div. 391, 59 N.Y. Supp. 193 (3d Dep't 1899); People v. Kraus, 147 Misc.
906, 265 N.Y. Supp. 294 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1933).
43. E.g., United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851); In re Cochran, 237 N.Y.
336, 143 N.E. 212 (1924) (criminal contempt); McHugh v. Jones, 258 App. Div. 111, 15
N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't 1939), af'd inem., 283 N.Y. 534, 29 N.E.2d 76, 17 N.Y.S.2d 396(1940); Davis v. Lorenzos, 258 App. Div. 933, 16 N.Y.S.2d 624 (4th Dep't 1939); Sindie v.
761 Ninth Ave. Corp., 127 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 939, 130
N.Y.S.2d 880 (1st Dep't 1954); Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 57 (Sup. Ct. 1805).
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fair trial rules." 44 The juror's unauthorized view is interpreted by the dissent
as independent evidence gathering for the purpose of checking the credibility
of courtroom testimony whereas the majority considers the juror's view as taken
in order to more easily understand the evidence. The dissent states that Lord
Mansfield's rule and its purposes apply only to jury room deliberations and
methods of arriving at verdicts. Jurors' affidavits of unauthorized views should be
considered on a motion for new trial, but it is not for the appellate court to
evaluate the prejudicial effect of the misconduct, since this is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial judge. The minority would remand to the trial
court for a hearing on the motion.45
The instant case represents the first time the New York Court of Appeals
has directly confronted the problem of a juror's self-impeachment in conjunction
with an unauthorized view. Instead of utilizing the opportunity to re-evaluate
Lord Mansfield's rule with respect to juror misconduct outside the jury room,
the Court dogmatically reaffirms the long established rule that a juror will not
be heard to impeach his own verdict. However, the 4-3 decision indicates an
undercurrent of dissatisfaction within the Court with the application of this rule
to juror misconduct outside the jury room. Policy considerations have weighed
heavily in the shaping of this exclusionary rule. The Court must choose between
the protection of individual rights and the preservation of the public administra-
tion of justice.40 However, where the misconduct occurs outside of the jury
room, the policy considerations favoring the application of the rule are dimin-
ished, particularly in light of the possibility of a great injustice done an injured
party for which he has no remedy. In admitting testimony of outside events there
will be no disclosure of deliberations or of the manner in reaching the verdict.
Hence, the jurors' frankness and freedom of discussion during deliberations will
not be inhibited. It is urged that the danger of jury tampering in reality is no
greater if the evidence is admitted.47 Generally jurors are the only persons who
know of the misconduct and the rule excludes the best available evidence. 48 The
fear of prolonged litigation and increasing uncertainty of jury verdicts by admit-
ting jurors' affidavits can be dispelled by the court's adoption of more restrictive
substantive grounds for impeachment. 49 Under the Model Code of Evidence ° and
44. Instant case at 296, 206 N.E.2d at 325, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
45. See People v. Shilitano, 215 N.Y. 715, 109 N.E. 500 (1915) (Cardozo, J.); People
v. Arata, 254 N.Y. 565, 173 N.E. 868 (1930); People v. Durling, 303 N.Y. 382, 103 N.E.2d
336 (1952).
46. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
47. Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874).
48. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J.
92, 118 A.2d 812, 58 A.L.R.2d 545 (1955); Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 57 (Sup.
Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting).
49. Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 360 (1958) (e.g., these
should not be grounds for impeachment: Majority verdicts in criminal cases; consideration
of specialized knowledge not in evidence; consideration of common knowledge such as liability
insurance, attorney's fees, or accused failure to testify).
50. Rule 301 (1942). "[Elvery member of the jury, may testify as to any material
matter .. . except that ... no evidence shall be received concerning the effect which anything
had upon the mind of a juror as tending to cause him to assent to or dissent from the ver-
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the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 51 these affidavits would be received. The Court
in" the instant case avoids considering whether the trial court should receive
evidence of the influence of the misconduct upon the juror's mind in reaching
his verdict. Unless the method of evaluating the effect of the misconduct on the
verdict is objective, the court is probing into the juror's mental processes during
his deliberations. The patent injustice inflicted upon a losing defendant requires
a re-evaluation of the policy grounds underlying the adoption of Lord Mansfield's
rule to juror misconduct outside the jury room, instead of repeating the dogma
that a juror may not impeach his own verdict.
ARTHUR A. Russ, JR.
FUTURE INTERESTS-APPLICATION OF STATUTE To BAR ENFORCE-,
MENT OF MATURED REVERTER HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
On May 11, 1854, John Townsend and wife deeded land and a building
to the Trustees of Walton Academy. The deed, duly recorded, contained a re-
verter clause providing that the deed was to be valid only so long as the
premises were used for an Academy and for nothing else. On failure of this
condition the premises were to revert to Townsend and his heirs.' They were
used for educational purposes by Walton Academy until April 1, 1962, when
such use was discontinued. Plaintiff Board of Education succeeded to the
Academy's rights. Under section 345(3) of the New York Real Property Law
(the statute at issue) defendant was required to file a Declaration of Intention
to Preserve Restrictions on the Use of Land, by Sept. 1, 1961. This Declaration
was filed on April 13, 1962, seven months after the deadline. Plaintiff Board of
Education sued for title on stipulated facts, under the same statute (discussed
infra), which was designed to eliminate certain restrictions on the use of land,
and won a unanimous judgment in the Appellate Division.2 On. defendants'
appeal, held, reversed. The recording provisions of section 345 of the New York
Real Property Law are unconstitutional in that-they impair the obligatioil of con-
tracts and deprive defendants of property without due process of law, when
applied so as to bar enforcement of a reverter which matured after the-date the
statute set for filing notice of intent to preserve the reverter. Chief Judge
dict ... or concerning the mental processes by which it was reached." Comment, 47 Mich. L.
Rev. 261 (1948).
51. Rule 41 "Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict. . . no evidence shall be
received to show the effect of any statement, concIuct, event or condition upon the mind of ajuror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the mental
processes by which it was determined."
1. The clause read: "Provided nevertheless that the said lot and the building thereon
shall be used for the purposes of an Academy and no other then this deed shall remain in
full force and effect otherwise it shall become Void and the premises herein conveyed shall
revert to the said John Townsend party of the first part and to his heirs." Instant case at
364, 207 N.E.2d at 183, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (1965).
2. Board of Educ. v. Miles, 18 A.D.2d 87, 238 N.Y.S.2d 766 (3d Dep't 1963).
